

# Cognitive Liberty in Canada: Protecting Mental Autonomy in the Digital Age

## Executive Summary

Canadian law currently lacks explicit protection for “cognitive liberty” – the ability of individuals to think, decide and process information free from coercive or hidden influence. Section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter **mentions** freedom of thought and opinion, but this right has never been judicially fleshed out beyond speech (and it only limits **state** action)[1][2]. Similarly, Section 7’s guarantee of “security of the person” has been interpreted to include bodily and psychological integrity, but only in cases of **direct state-imposed harm** (e.g. forced sterilization, child custody removal) and then only when the psychological injury is “serious and profound”[2]. These doctrines were developed long before digital persuasion, targeted ads or algorithmic recommendation systems existed, and they contain *no explicit concepts* of mental autonomy or protection from covert influence. By contrast, many private-sector techniques (social media algorithms, “dark patterns” in web design, psychographic advertising) are purpose-built to shape what we think and feel, often without our awareness[3][4]. Canadian consumers have little legal recourse when algorithms nudge or manipulate choices: private platforms owe no Charter duty, and existing consumer/competition laws cover only outright lies or financial harm[1][5].

### Key Findings:

- **Charter Gaps.** The Charter’s “freedom of thought, belief and opinion” (s.2(b)) binds only government, not private data companies[1]. And “security of the person” (s.7) requires state action causing grave psychological injury[2] – it offers no clear protection against non-violent, algorithmic interference by private actors.
- **Civil Law Gaps.** Contract and tort law recognize capacity, consent and undue influence, but only in narrow contexts. No case treats online manipulation (e.g. dark patterns or algorithmic persuasion) as invalidating consent. Privacy laws (PIPEDA) regulate data collection but not *how* data is used to shape belief or behavior. Competition/consumer law bans false advertising, but not subtle psychological influence per se[6].
- **International Trends.** Global scholars increasingly call for “neuro-rights” or cognitive liberty protections. For example, the UK’s Online Safety Act

explicitly requires platforms to protect users’ “right to freedom of thought” from harmful content[7]. Human rights bodies (ICCPR Article 18/19) enshrine freedom of conscience/thought and opinion, but their application to digital influence remains undeveloped. Australia’s Human Rights Commission warns that brain–computer tech and AI “draw into question the traditional boundaries” of thought and human rights[8].

- **Evidence Challenges.** Demonstrating cognitive interference is inherently difficult. It may require interdisciplinary proof (digital forensics of algorithms, psychological assessments, data analysis). There are no established protocols: courts would struggle to discern when targeted content crossed from persuasion to coercion.

**Recommendations:** To fill these gaps, Canadian law should explicitly recognize *cognitive liberty* (or *cognitive integrity*) as a fundamental value. This could take form as statutory principles or rights (e.g. defining a right to thought privacy or mental autonomy in a Charter-like context). We suggest:

- **Statutory Rights/Definitions.** Enact a legal definition of “cognitive liberty” or “mental autonomy” (e.g. a right not to have one’s mental states manipulated without informed consent). For example, a statute could prohibit non-consensual use of technology to impair decision-making or alter mental processes.
- **Duty of Care for Platforms.** Impose obligations on digital platforms and advertisers to respect cognitive liberty. This might include mandatory privacy-by-design for recommendation engines, regular algorithmic bias and harm audits, or liability for demonstrable psychological harms.
- **Algorithmic Transparency.** Require disclosure of when and how algorithms influence content (e.g. “You are in an echo chamber” labels) and user-friendly consent processes (e.g. easy opt-outs from data-driven nudges). Canada’s proposed AI governance (AIDA) provides a starting point, but should specifically address manipulative outputs as a consumer safety issue.
- **Enforcement Mechanisms.** Give existing regulators (Privacy Commissioner, Competition Bureau) explicit mandates to consider cognitive harm. Consider creating a “Cognitive Integrity Commission” or designate cognitive impacts in human rights tribunals. Remedies could include injunctive relief (e.g. to force disclosure) and statutory damages for cognitive rights violations.

- **Evidentiary Protocols (see App. D).** Develop guidelines for documenting and proving influence: preserving logs of targeted content, psychological expert evaluation of harm, digital audits of algorithms, and secure disclosure of platform data. Courts and investigators will need interdisciplinary tools (AI auditors, cognitive scientists, digital forensics) to enforce any new rules.

This report analyzes these issues in depth. It surveys Canadian case law and legislation (esp. Charter cases and privacy/consumer statutes), reviews social science on digital influence, and compares international approaches (EU, UK, Australia). We conclude with concrete draft clauses and policy steps to make “cognitive liberty” a practical legal principle in Canada.

## 1. Legal Foundations of Cognitive Autonomy

**Charter Rights:** The starting point is Canada’s Charter. Section 2(b) guarantees “freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression,” but courts have largely treated it as a freedom of *expression*, not a substantive “inner realm” protection[1]. The Charter applies only to government conduct, not private actors[1]. As Laidlaw observes, this means that today’s chief threats to our inner freedoms – social media algorithms, data-driven persuasion, immersive technologies – come from private platforms, against which s.2(b) offers “no direct constitutional duty”[1]. In practice Canada has never enforced a Charter claim purely to protect mental privacy or thought. Even so, the Charter does hint at protected autonomy in Section 7: the Supreme Court has interpreted “security of the person” to include psychological integrity (beyond mere physical safety) when state action causes **profound** psychological harm[2]. For example, *R. v. Morgentaler* recognized that liberty includes the right to make fundamental personal decisions (abortion)[9]. In *New Brunswick v. G.*, the Court struck down forced sterilizations on s.7 grounds, explicitly referring to both bodily and “psychological integrity”[2]. However, even these cases required *serious* state interference (e.g. removal of a child, forced medical procedure)[2]. Mere “stress” or exposure to advertising, no matter how subtle, would never meet that bar.

**Table 1: Selected Charter Doctrines**

Provision	Protects (interest)	Key Cases / Doctrine	Gap for Digital Influence
<b>s.2(b)</b>	Freedom of thought, belief, opinion (and	<i>R. Keegstra</i> (hate speech), etc – speech &	Applies only to government; private

Provision	Protects (interest)	Key Cases / Doctrine	Gap for Digital Influence
	expression)[1]	beliefs	algorithmic profiling unaffected[1]
s.7	“Security of person” – bodily & psychological integrity[2]	<i>Morgentaler</i> (abortion), <i>Carter</i> (assisted dying), <i>G. (J.)</i> (custody)[9][2]	Requires state action causing severe harm. Digital ads & nudges are private and diffuse, unlikely to qualify[2]
s.1	Reasonable limits	Non-specific (“demonstrably justified”)	Not engaged without Charter violation (so far none for cognition)
<b>Other Charter</b>	e.g. s.2(a) conscience, s.15 equality	Broad rights, but no case law on influencing beliefs	No jurisprudence on algorithmic belief interference

Sources: Laidlaw (2024)[1]; Charterpedia[2].

**Contract Law:** Traditional contract doctrine assumes parties have *free will*. Consent vitiators include incapacity (e.g. intoxication), misrepresentation and **undue influence** (where one party abuses a relationship of trust to overbear will). However, these concepts require a personal relationship or clear deception. Courts have not considered whether a social-media platform, by manipulating information flows, could amount to “undue influence” on every user. Nor is there a recognized tort for covert “brain hacking.” Thus, digital persuasion today falls through the cracks of contract law – unless an ad is demonstrably false or a sign-up contract is procedurally unconscionable.

**Tort Law:** Canadian torts provide some analogues (e.g. negligence, intentional infliction of mental harm), but none explicitly cover cognitive manipulation. A defendant owes a duty of care generally to avoid causing foreseeable harm, including psychological harm in limited contexts. Courts will impose liability for *negligence* when a special relationship or promise to safeguard psychological wellbeing exists (e.g. medical or custodial situations)[10]. But merely designing an algorithm to maximize engagement, even if it leads to addiction or anxiety, has not been held tortious. The remote and diffuse nature of online influence makes it hard to pin on any specific wrongdoer. (By contrast, traditional torts like battery or assault only apply to direct physical interference, not mental nudges.)

**Privacy and Consumer Protections:** Canadian privacy laws (federal PIPEDA and provincial analogues) protect personal data and require meaningful consent for data use, but they do not explicitly address *behavioral* manipulation. A company must tell you how your data is used, but it is typically free to use that data to target content as long as you agreed. Consumer protection laws (Competition Act, provincial business practices acts) ban *false or misleading representations* and “unfair practices.” Some digital manipulations could be framed as deceptive marketing (e.g. hidden fees, fake scarcity messages), but these laws catch only clear violations, not nuanced persuasion. The Office of Consumer Affairs notes that “dark patterns” – user-interface tricks to sway decisions – may eventually breach the Competition Act’s ban on misleading conduct[6], but enforcement is rare. In short, current statutes address certain harms (privacy breaches, financial fraud, identity theft) but offer no remedy for loss of cognitive control.

## 2. Influence in the Digital Environment

Modern influence systems operate at scale and often invisibly. Examples include:

- **Algorithmic recommender systems** (social media newsfeeds, video platforms): These profile users by behavior and then serve tailored content to maximize engagement. As Alegre and Shull note, ubiquitous recommendation engines “profile us and tell us what to watch or read,” while emerging brain–computer interfaces may soon “read” thoughts directly[4]. These algorithms intertwine machine learning with mass surveillance and psychology to nudge users subtly[11]. What a user perceives as a simple suggestion might actually be the output of a complex model optimized for time-on-site[11].
- **Targeted advertising and political influence:** Companies aggregate data (locations, likes, social graph) to micro-target ads and political messages.

Psychographic targeting (e.g. Cambridge Analytica-style) aims to exploit individual vulnerabilities. Techniques like “dark patterns” in UX design (pre-checked boxes, obscure unsubscribe buttons, false urgency banners) are legal in Canada so far, but expressly manipulate choices[5]. Provincial privacy regulators have recently investigated such practices (e.g. “Privacy Dark Patterns” report), but again enforcement is challenging.

- **Disinformation and behavioral campaigns:** Actors (state and non-state) run large-scale influence operations by flooding platforms with memes, fake news, or deepfakes. While outright lies can sometimes be labeled illegal (e.g. electoral fraud), much “misinformation” spreads unchecked. Governments are only just considering whether regulatory tools (like EU Digital Services Act, Canadian Online Harms initiatives) are needed to police such content.
- **Persuasive design in apps and devices:** Beyond web interfaces, designers use colors, sounds and reward feedback (e.g. “likes” and notifications) to addict users. These neuro-psychological tools are not captured by existing law except insofar as they could cause diagnosable addiction, which is rarely litigated.

Collectively, these systems shape users’ *decision environment* – the information and cues surrounding every digital interaction. As Alegre and Shull warn, “as technology increasingly mediates our access to information,” it inevitably “affects our ability to choose and think for ourselves, undermining our agency”[12]. For example, prolonged exposure to algorithmically-recommended “echo chamber” content can skew beliefs or emotions (e.g. fueling anxiety, radicalization, or eating disorders)[13]. Our decisions – what to buy, vote for, even how to parent or meditate – are filtered through lens of code whose priorities (advertiser revenue, user engagement) are hidden from us.

**Threat Model (Observable Systems):** In analyzing legal needs, we focus on actual, measurable mechanisms, not conspiratorial fantasies. The threats we consider include:

- *Algorithmic Persuasion:* When content personalization (newsfeeds, product suggestions) is driven by opaque algorithms that adapt to maximize certain metrics (clicks, shares, views).
- *Targeted Advertising:* Data-driven ads that leverage psychological profiles (demographic, behavioral, inferred traits) to influence consumer or voter behavior.

- *Dark Patterns & UI Manipulation*: Design choices in websites/apps that push users toward unwanted actions (e.g. hard-to-find privacy settings, deceptive “free trial” sign-ups).
- *Misinformation & Content Manipulation*: Coordinated campaigns to seed doubt or fear (e.g. on public health, elections) via social media bots or tailored messaging.

These are all documented phenomena in academic and regulatory sources[3][12][5]. Importantly, we **do not** assume hidden chip implants, thought-reading devices, or secret mind-control rays. All our analysis and recommendations target visible, traceable systems where evidence can, in principle, be gathered (see *Appendix D*).

### 3. Comparative and Emerging Approaches

Even abroad, law is struggling with these issues. Notable examples include:

- **United Kingdom**: The recent *Online Safety Act* (enacted 2023) breaks new ground by imposing duties on platforms to protect users’ rights, explicitly including “the right to freedom of thought and conscience”[7]. In practice, this means services must consider whether their algorithms or content amplify ideologies that threaten autonomy. While the UK law focuses mainly on illegal content and child safety, its recognition of cognitive rights as a design factor is instructive.
- **European Union**: The AI Act (adopted 2023) regulates high-risk AI systems (e.g. biometric IDs) and demands transparency (e.g. informing users they are interacting with AI). It does not yet frame cognitive manipulation as a distinct harm, but EU data protection law (GDPR) treats “biometric” or “health” data as special categories – a principle that could be extended to neural data. Separately, UNESCO and the Council of Europe have advisory documents (e.g. the 2019 *Recommendation on Human Rights and Neuroscience*) warning that neurotechnologies could threaten mental privacy and autonomy, and suggesting new rights (mental privacy, integrity). Some Latin American countries (Chile, Colombia) have even introduced constitutional neuro-rights (e.g. “inviolability of mental integrity”).
- **Australia**: The Australian Human Rights Commission’s 2023 report “Protecting Cognition” flags that brain–computer interfaces and AI algorithms “draw into question the traditional boundaries” of an individual’s thoughts[8]. It calls on regulators to ensure freedom of thought

in technology policies. Though non-binding, this reflects a rising global awareness that digital influence implicates human rights.

In Canada, Parliament has not yet confronted this head-on. However, policymakers are beginning to listen. The Office of the Privacy Commissioner (OPC) funded research on “Hacking the Human Mind,” leading to calls for a UN Human Rights Committee General Comment on freedom of thought in the digital age[14]. Alberta and B.C. task forces on harmful content have questioned existing laws’ adequacy. The federal government’s new Digital Charter and AI strategy acknowledge concerns about trust and psychological impact, hinting at future reform[15][16].

**International Law Context:** Canada is party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Article 18 (freedom of thought, conscience, religion) and 19 (expression) are relevant. However, neither treaty defines “thought” rights in the context of technology. Courts in Canada have not yet read these rights as providing standalone protections against digital influence. The UN’s Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and UNESCO’s recent reports both stress the need to protect mental integrity against “mind hacking.” Given these trends, Canada has an opportunity to lead rather than lag on translating broad human-rights norms into concrete laws for the digital era.

## 4. Identified Legal Gaps

Synthesizing the above, we identify key “gaps” where cognitive autonomy is unprotected (see Table 2). Essentially, the law presumes **free will**: it assumes that absent extreme duress, people make decisions. But modern influence systems can *steer* willpower in non-violent ways. The critical question is whether existing doctrines can stretch to cover this. Our analysis suggests:

- **Charter:** Section 7’s high threshold and state-centric scope make it unlikely to ever cover private digital influence[1][2]. Section 2(b) is similarly toothless against algorithms (charter vs companies)[1].
- **Contract:** No jurisprudence equates algorithmic recommendation with “undue influence.” In equity, undue influence requires a fiduciary relationship or a transaction that calls for explanation, not present in normal platform-user interactions. A hidden agenda of an app or site is *not* legally equivalent to a false statement or fraudulent inducement.
- **Tort:** Negligence law has no recognized duty to prevent cognitive manipulation. Intentional torts (e.g. assault or battery) require physical contact; Wilful infliction of nervous shock requires actual psychiatric

illness, not merely feeling “persuaded.” Canadian tort law is not yet prepared to award damages for cognitive distortions from social media.

- **Privacy:** PIPEDA governs personal data usage, but it is reactive and focused on data breaches and consent at time of collection[3]. It does not ban profiling or psychographic targeting, so long as privacy notices are (technically) provided. Complaints can be filed if profiling is abusive, but this route is cumbersome.
- **Competition/Consumer:** The Competition Act outlaws “false or misleading representations” (s.52), but a manipulative UI or an algorithm that changes behavior is not obviously a false representation. Similarly, provincial consumer protection laws forbid unconscionable practices, but have not been tested on “cognitive marketing” schemes.

**Table 2: Legal Doctrines vs. Influence Mechanisms**

Domain	Protected Interest(s)	Example Doctrine/ Statute	How It Falls Short for Cognitive Influences
<b>Constitutional (Charter)</b>	<i>Life, Liberty, Security</i> (s.7); <i>Thought/Opinion</i> (s.2(b))[1][2]	<i>Morgentaler, Blencoe</i> , etc (security of person requires severe harm) [2]	Only bars extreme state-induced psychological harm; says nothing about private, persistent influence (social media, ads)[1]. Charter applies only to government, so platform manipulation escapes s.2(b) [1].
<b>Contract Law</b>	Free consent, capacity,	Doctrine of <i>undue</i>	Designed for one-on-one

Domain	Protected Interest(s)	Example Doctrine/ Statute	How It Falls Short for Cognitive Influences
<b>Tort Law</b>	absence of undue influence	<i>influence, unconscionability</i>	relationships (parent/child, lawyer/client); no case law on mass persuasion. Online consenting to terms remains valid despite subtle nudges.
<b>Tort Law</b>	Bodily integrity; mental/psychiatric harm (if recognized)	Negligence, <i>infliction of mental suffering</i> (Wilkinson tort)	No duty of care for “cognitive safety.” Psychological harm torts require known harmful act with intent to cause actual harm; algorithmic tailoring is indirect.
<b>Privacy Law (PIPEDA)</b>	Data privacy, informed consent for data use	PIPEDA (Accountability, consent, security)[3]	Regulates data handling, not how data is used to influence thoughts. An “opt-in” to data collection does not imply consent to be

Domain	Protected Interest(s)	Example Doctrine/ Statute	How It Falls Short for Cognitive Influences
<b>Consumer/ Competition</b>	Truthful marketing; financial fairness	Competition Act (false/misleading ads)[6]; provincial consumer acts	psychologically profiled or manipulated. Covers outright deception, but not subtle persuasion. Example: “Buy now!” button clickbait is not an untrue statement, so it isn’t banned. Dark patterns are only recently being flagged as unfair.
<b>Administrative/Regulatory</b>	Safety, health in digital media	Proposed AI Act (AIDA) focuses on “serious harm”; Online Safety (UK) recognizes FoT[7]	Canada’s AIDA draft (2022) focuses on high-risk AI (health/safety) but does not explicitly cover cognitive harms. No Canadian regulator currently enforces cognitive autonomy

Domain	Protected Interest(s)	Example Doctrine/ Statute	How It Falls Short for Cognitive Influences rights.
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Notes: PIPEDA = Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act; FoT = freedom of thought[3][7].

## 5. Recommended Legal Reforms

To address these gaps, Canadian law must evolve. We recommend the following **policy and legislative actions** (detailed drafts in Appendix C):

1. **Define and Enshrine Cognitive Rights:** Introduce a statutory recognition of **Cognitive Liberty/Cognitive Integrity**. For example, a clause in a new federal privacy or human rights statute could state: *“Every person has a right to cognitive integrity: the autonomy to think, believe, and process information without non-consensual manipulation or interference.”* This right could be modeled on existing freedom-of-thought language in human rights instruments, but clarified for the digital context (similar to how sexual consent laws define “consent” to address digital records of intimacy). A definition could explicitly ban certain practices (e.g. “no individual shall be subjected to targeted psychological manipulation via technology without informed consent,” as a normative standard). Even if Constitutional entrenchment (Charter amendment) is unrealistic, a statutory right would signal legislative intent and support common-law development of remedies.
2. **Extend Privacy/Data Laws to “Neural Data”:** Amend privacy legislation (PIPEDA or provincial acts) to classify data about mental states or inferred profiles as “sensitive” or “biometric” data. Require higher protections for any data used to predict or influence beliefs. This could mirror GDPR’s handling of health data and genetics. Companies would then need explicit, granular consent to use algorithms that influence user opinions.
3. **Impose Duty of Care on Platforms:** Draw on tort law’s duty concept: explicitly state that providers of AI-driven platforms owe a duty not to undermine users’ cognitive autonomy. For high-impact systems (e.g. social media, search engines), require impact assessments similar to environmental law: companies must evaluate and disclose risks of

cognitive harm (addiction, misinformation impact) before deploying new algorithms. If harm is foreseeable and severe, regulations could obligate modifications or triggers to pause recommendations (analogous to drug or product safety standards).

4. **Algorithmic Transparency and Control:** Mandate transparency measures to let individuals monitor influence mechanisms. This could include:
5. **Explainable AI:** Users must be informed when they interact with algorithmically curated content (e.g. “Your newsfeed is personalized by Algorithm X”), and provided a simple way to reset or disable personalization.
6. **Influence Labels:** Content that uses targeted persuasive techniques (e.g. marketing that uses “dark pattern” elements) should carry labels or warnings, as is being considered in EU digital services regulation.
7. **Data Portability:** Strengthen rights for individuals to obtain and transfer their profile data, so privacy commissioners or researchers can audit influence flows.
8. **Evidentiary Rules and Enforcement:** Develop standards for proving cognitive interference (detailed in Appendix D). For example:
9. Allow individuals to request platform records (under court order or through privacy law) showing how their content was selected.
10. Permit independent experts to analyze algorithmic outputs using techniques like adversarial auditing.
11. Set a “legal presumption” that certain manipulative design (documented dark patterns, hidden feedback loops) is prima facie evidence of undue influence, shifting the burden onto companies to justify their practices.
12. **Remedies and Rights Enforcement:** Specify remedies for cognitive rights violations. These could include:
13. **Injunctions:** Courts or regulators could order removal of harmful features or change in algorithms.
14. **Compensatory Damages:** Statutory damages for individuals who suffer demonstrable harm (e.g. financial loss due to being deceived by an algorithm, or diagnosable psychological injury).

15. **Penalties:** Fines for companies violating cognitive rights duties (analogous to privacy fines).
16. **Role for Privacy and Competition Regulators:** Give the OPC and Competition Bureau mandates to investigate cases of algorithmic manipulation. The OPC’s mandate could explicitly cover “psychological privacy,” and the Competition Bureau could treat certain manipulative marketing as deceptive practices.
17. **Regulatory Bodies:** Consider establishing a specialized body (e.g. “Digital Mind Commission”) to oversee cognitive security, akin to the Workplace Safety and Insurance Board for physical harm. This agency could collate reports, conduct audits of major platforms, and issue binding guidelines. It might also host a public register of AI audits and algorithmic impact statements.

## 6. Implementation Roadmap

We propose a phased **advocacy timeline** for integrating cognitive liberty into law (illustrated below). Initially, efforts focus on building consensus and defining terms; later stages involve legislative drafting and enforcement mechanisms.

timeline

title Advocacy Roadmap for Cognitive Liberty in Canada

2023 : Research and Public Awareness (CIGI briefs, OPC studies)

2024 : Stakeholder Consultations (law firms, civil society, tech) & Draft Policy

Framework

2025 : Introduce Legislation (Privacy/AIDA amendments, new Bill on mental autonomy)

2026 : Regulatory Rulemaking & Enforcement Pilot Programs

*Figure 1: Proposed timeline for developing cognitive liberty law and policies.*

Key steps:

- **2023–24:** Law firms and policymakers collaborate to refine definitions (as we do here). Launch public consultations (possibly via privacy commission or standing committee). Provide educational briefs to courts and legislators (Appendix A/B).
- **2025:** If momentum builds, draft amendments to existing bills (e.g. add cognitive clauses to AIDA, Digital Charter proposals) or introduce new legislation.

- **2026:** Official rules and guidelines. Begin enforcement by empowered agencies, and introduce cognitive-impact review in government tech procurement.

## Appendices

### Appendix A – Two-Page Legal Awareness Brief

#### (For law firms and policymakers – concise format)

# Cognitive Liberty: Emerging Legal Issues in Canada (Brief)

**\*\*Issue:\*\*** Modern technology can influence thoughts and decisions in unprecedented ways. Canadian law has no explicit protection for an individual’s right to maintain independent mental processes, raising questions about consent, liability, and human rights.

**\*\*Key Legal Concepts:\*\***

- **\*Cognitive Liberty:\*** The autonomy to control one’s own mind and thought processes.
- **\*Cognitive Integrity:\*** The protection of one’s mental faculties from unwarranted interference.

**\*\*Current Law:\*\***

- **\*\*Charter:\*\*** Guarantees freedom of thought/expression (s.2(b)) and security of the person (s.7), but these doctrines only apply to government actions. Corporations (social media, platforms) have no Charter duties, leaving users unprotected from private “mind hacking.”
- **\*\*Contract:\*\*** Valid contracts assume informed consent. Hidden psychological manipulation (algorithmic nudges, dark-pattern UI) is not recognized as “undue influence” under Canadian contract law.
- **\*\*Tort:\*\*** No clear duty exists to shield users from non-physical harms of digital persuasion. Traditional tort remedies address bodily/psychiatric harm, not subtle cognitive shifts.
- **\*\*Privacy:\*\*** PIPEDA governs data collection/consent, but not how data-driven algorithms may influence thoughts. Advanced profiling is largely unchecked beyond notice-and-consent rules.
- **\*\*Competition/Consumer:\*\*** False advertising and unfair practices laws cover overt deception but not nuanced persuasion. Some “dark patterns” may violate consumer laws, but enforcement is sparse.

**\*\*Why It Matters:\*\***

- **\*Everyday Impact:\*** From online shopping to voting, technology shapes decisions. If algorithms skew information to undermine free choice, fundamental principles

(informed consent, personal autonomy) are weakened.

- **Legal Uncertainty:** Lawyers face novel questions: What if an algorithmic recommendation induced a user to sign a contract they wouldn't otherwise? Can a manipulated purchase be rescinded? These questions lack clear answers.
- **Human Rights:** Freedom of thought and opinion are core rights under international law. Emerging neuro-rights proposals (e.g. mental privacy, no "brain hacking") suggest Canada should consider analogous protections.

#### **Comparative Insight:**

- **UK:** The Online Safety Act (2023) explicitly tasks platforms with protecting users' freedom of thought[7].
- **Australia:** Human Rights Commission calls for safeguards as "neurotech draws into question... the boundaries of the mind"[8].
- **Canada:** OPC-commissioned studies urge government to clarify freedom of thought in law. Alberta/B.C. task forces on disinformation flagged gaps in current regulations.

#### **Recommendations (Preliminary):**

1. **Define Cognitive Liberty:** Statutorily recognize the right to mental autonomy. For example, an amendment could read: "Every person has the right to cognitive liberty – to think and decide freely without clandestine technological interference."
2. **Expand Privacy Protection:** Treat psychological profiles as sensitive data. Require meaningful opt-in for any targeting aimed at influencing beliefs.
3. **Impose Platform Duty of Care:** Mandate that tech companies assess and mitigate cognitive harms (e.g. algorithm audits, influence-impact statements).
4. **Strengthen Consent:** Update consumer law to invalidate contracts obtained via deceptive digital practices (e.g. hidden fees, forced upselling through dark patterns).
5. **Empower Regulators:** Give the Privacy Commissioner and Competition Bureau explicit powers to investigate and penalize manipulative algorithms and marketing.

#### **Next Steps for Engaging Firms/ Policymakers:**

- Discuss how cognitive liberty issues intersect with existing practice areas (e.g. privacy law, consumer protection, constitutional litigation).
- Collaborate on drafting discussion papers or amicus briefs highlighting cognitive integrity.
- Explore cross-disciplinary expertise (psychologists, AI researchers) to help evaluate cases.

#### **Source References:**

Charter analysis (Lamer C.J. in *New Brunswick v. G.* on psychological integrity[2]); Privacy law (PIPEDA principles); CIGI policy research on "mind hacking"[1]; OPC reports on online influence.

## Appendix B – One-Page Engagement Sheet for Law Firms

### # Cognitive Liberty Collaboration Invite

**\*\*What's Happening?\*** Technological advances in AI, social media, and neurotech are beginning to challenge basic assumptions in law. For instance, imagine your client's decision-making being subtly steered by algorithmic newsfeeds or targeted ads. Current Canadian law doesn't explicitly address such "mind hacking."

**\*\*Why It Matters to Lawyers:\***

- **\*\*Clients' Rights:\*** Everyone assumes free will in contracts, wills, and litigation. Cognitive influence raises questions of consent and capacity (e.g. could a sale be voided if advanced persuasion was used?).
- **\*\*New Practice Areas:\*** Emerging issues at the intersection of tech and law (privacy, AI liability, consumer protection) could open new advisory roles.
- **\*\*Thought Leadership:\*** Firms that define the legal framework for cognitive autonomy can position themselves as leaders in this cutting-edge field.

**\*\*Key Issues for Counsel:\***

- **\*Contract Validity:\*** Is agreement real if an algorithm warped the decision-making process?
- **\*Tort/Liability:\*** When (if ever) can a user sue a tech company for psychological harm? What duty of care is owed?
- **\*Regulation & Compliance:\*** How should businesses prepare for potential laws on AI transparency, privacy, and anti-manipulation?

**\*\*Our Proposal:\*** We are drafting a **\*\*"Cognitive Liberty"\*** research paper and open call to law firms for input. It will define the concept, outline legal gaps, and propose model statutes and rights. We seek collaborations on:

- **Concept validation:** Ensuring the framing of cognitive autonomy is legally sound.
- **Draft language:** Crafting statutory definitions that could fit into Canadian law.
- **Case strategy:** Identifying legal avenues (Charter, privacy, consumer protection) for protecting clients.

**\*\*How Firms Can Contribute:\***

- Assign experts (litigators, IP/technology, privacy specialists) to join a working group.
- Provide feedback on draft white papers (e.g. critique definitions, test hypotheticals).
- Co-host roundtables on "digital influence and the law."
- Explore strategic litigation opportunities or legislative proposals together.

**\*\*Next Steps:\*** We will release our draft research paper on **\*Cognitive Liberty in Canada\*** on [date] and host an initial briefing session. Interested firms are invited to contact [Researcher Name] at [email] to receive materials and suggest collaboration.

## Appendix C – Draft Statutory Language

### # Proposed Statutory Provisions (Illustrative)

#### **\*\*Bill X: Cognitive Liberty Act (Draft Excerpts)\*\***

##### **\*\*Part 1 – Definitions\*\***

- **\*\*“Cognitive Liberty”\*\*** means the right of every individual to autonomy over their own mental processes, including freedom of thought and freedom from non-consensual manipulation of beliefs or decision-making.
- **\*\*“Cognitive Manipulation”\*\*** means the use of technology (including software algorithms, applications, or devices) to influence an individual’s thoughts, beliefs, perceptions or decisions without their informed consent.

##### **\*\*Part 2 – Rights and Duties\*\***

1. **\*\*Right to Cognitive Integrity:\*\*** Every person has the right to cognitive liberty. No person shall, without consent, use digital or other technological means to materially impair another person’s capacity to think independently or to alter their mental states.
2. **\*\*Protection by Service Providers:\*\*** Companies offering online platforms, social media, or AI-driven content services must take reasonable measures to safeguard cognitive liberty of users. This includes:
  - a. Conducting regular impact assessments of algorithms for undue influence.
  - b. Disclosing to users when content is personalized or targeted, and providing a simple mechanism to opt-out.
  - c. Avoiding design practices (e.g. dark patterns) known to impair free choice.
3. **\*\*Privacy of Mental Data:\*\*** Personal information revealing or predicting mental states (e.g. neurological data, psychological profiles) is deemed “sensitive personal data.” Its collection, use or disclosure for targeting influence requires express informed consent under the Privacy Act.

##### **\*\*Part 3 – Enforcement and Remedies\*\***

- **\*\*Civil Remedies:\*\*** Individuals whose cognitive liberty is violated may seek injunctions and statutory damages. The court may order disclosure of relevant data (logs, AI models) upon a prima facie showing of manipulation.
- **\*\*Regulatory Powers:\*\*** The Privacy Commissioner and Competition Bureau are empowered to investigate practices affecting cognitive liberty. They may issue fines for non-compliance (up to \$X per violation). A new “Cognitive Liberty Tribunal” may be established for specialized hearings.
- **\*\*Rule-making:\*\*** The Minister of Justice shall, within 1 year, develop regulations defining prohibited manipulative techniques and standards for algorithmic transparency.

## Appendix D – Evidence-Gathering Protocol (Outline)

### # Evidence Protocol: Documenting Cognitive Interference

**Objective:** To reliably establish when an individual’s cognitive liberty has been impacted by technology.

- User Data Logs:** Preserve records of content served (newsfeeds, ads, recommendations) and user interactions (clicks, viewing time). These can show correlation between algorithmic inputs and user behavior.
- Algorithmic Audit:** Where possible, obtain (via legal process) the AI model or decision rules used. Independent experts can run controlled tests (e.g. feed standardized inputs) to see how the algorithm behaves.
- Psychological Assessment:** Clinical evaluation of the individual may be needed to show harm. Standardize criteria (using DSM or expert testimony) to diagnose any mental health condition or cognitive impairment linked to the timeline of exposure.
- Comparative Analysis:** Compare the subject’s experience to control groups. For instance, test if people with different profiles receive systematically different content, indicating profile-based manipulation.
- Expert Reports:** Engage multidisciplinary experts (psychologists, neuroscientists, data scientists) to interpret findings. They can explain the plausibility and mechanism of influence to a fact-finder.
- Witnesses and Context:** Collect testimonies about the context of technology use. For example, did the user believe they were making a voluntary choice, or did the interface obscure options?
- Company Policies:** Obtain documents (terms of service, privacy policies, design guidelines) to show whether known persuasive tactics were implemented intentionally.
- Legal Discovery:** Use privacy or securities law provisions to compel evidence from companies. E.g. regulatory data access rights, or subpoenas in litigation.

**Goal:** Create a reproducible standard for “influence forensics,” akin to how a crime lab documents evidence. This will lend credibility in courts and help enforce any new cognitive liberty laws.

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